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Introduction:
BaronBramwell at the End of
the TwentiethCentury
A. EPSTEIN
by RICHARD
Fads and fashions in legal history are often very difficult to predict.
Legal history in America, for example, is now heavily weighted to the
study of American law and American institutions. The assumed dominance of English common law in the American Courts, which was very
much a nineteenth century fixture, waned somewhat between 1900 and
the end of World War II. During the past 50 years, the decline has been
still sharper.With the notable exception of the criminal law, English law
has been much less in evidence on the civil law side of American law:
property,tort,contract,and restitution.
Explanationsfor the apparentretreatof English common law within
the Americansetting are not difficult to come by. The most obvious point
is that the American system has come of age: the sprawling nature of
common law in America makes it difficult for English cases, especially
recent English cases, to fit underone tent. After all, with 50 states and 13
Federal Circuitschurningout decision after decision, why should anyone
search for persuasive authorityacross the Atlantic?Before the epic decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,1 the SupremeCourtprovided some glue
by making substantivelaw on importantcommon law issues. But once the
Court committed itself to reflecting instead of making common law, the
centripetalforces in the system became far greater.Each state became a
law unto itself, and the English decision-that loomed so large before the
Supreme Court slowly receded from view. To be sure, the classical
English opinions still continue to wield some influence in the United
States today: given their early incorporationinto the fabric of American
law, they were carried forward throughthe earlier American cases. But
more recent English opinions find it much harderto secure a foothold in
this country because earlier American cases do not bring them to the
attentionof contemporaryAmericanjudges. Since time and money limit
the willingness to search,English opinions were first overlookedand then
more consciously ignored.
Otherforces are also at work, for the basic structureof common law
has changed as an outgrowth of two separate forces. First, the level of
statutory intervention into areas that were once dominated by common
law has proceeded apace both in England and America. While there is
only a limited menu of judicial rules that could be developed in a system
dedicated to the principle of freedom of contract,thousands of different
1. 304 U.S. 64 (1938)
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alternativescan be introducedeither throughthe codification of common
law rules, or, more emphaticallystill, throughlegislative activity that selfconsciously limits the scope of contractual freedom. Yet, once these
statutesare on the books, the ability and inclinationof judges to returnto
common law precedents is severely limited. Codes and statutes are normally conceived of as self-containedbodies of law, and their sound explication dependsonly in parton the common law principlesthat these codes
and statuteswere designed to displace. In a world of statutorycompromises and administrativeintrigue, general principles are harderto articulate,
and paradoxically,less importantas well. No one pretendsthat the latest
variation in a consumer credit statute is the outgrowth of the enduring
principles of common law. To master the operation of the statute, it is
necessary to begin with its text, and often to pursuethe regulationspassed
to construethe elaboratecompromisesthat led to its passage. This process
necessarily precludesany reliance, explicit or implicit, on the decisions of
Englishjudges.
English cases are also less importantin the United States because of
differences in our two constitutionalstructures.In England, Parliamentis
the boss, and whateverit says goes, so long as it says it clearly-which it
can, at least to the satisfactionof Englishjudges. Americanjudges do not
play second fiddle to the legislature,but reservethe power underboth federal and state law to declare state laws unconstitutional.This difference in
judicial authority has led to a difference in ways of thinking. English
judges are reticentto look at the policies behind statuteswhose commands
they understand:plain meaning as a canon of construction, indeed as a
way of life, has lasted much longer in Englandthan in this country.Given
our capacious Constitution,Americanjudges feel free, and indeed compelled, to look at these ultimate policies in order to see whether a challenged statutesquareswith some constitutionalprovision of broadgenerality, be it on the enduring verities of speech, religion, property, due
process, or equal protection.The habitsof mind thatAmericanjudges cultivated in their constitutionalrole often carry over to their common law
work: after all, what judge will be content to follow common law precedent when the granderconstitutionalstyles of litigation have become customary.As the patternsof judicial thinkingappearto change, so the separationbetween the Americanlegal system and its English forbearscontinues apace.
In some sense, I view these trends with genuine regret. My own
legal education began in the mid-1960s with a law degree from Oxford,
where my course of study began not with English but Roman Law. I was
steeped in the learningof the great Englishjudges of the eighteenth,nineteenth, and twentieth centuries, because older precedentstended to hold
on longer in a unitaryjurisdictionthat followed (as England did then) a
strict principle of stare decisis. No one would believe me if I said that a
Yale Law School educationremoved whateveraffection I had for English
law before I entered teaching. And it did not. But there is now, happily,
some reason to think that once again we have an interest in English law,
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as evidenced by this symposium on the work of Baron Bramwell. Quite
independently, I received in the mail manuscripts prepared by David
Abrahamand Anita Ramasastryon the legal thought of Baron Bramwell,
long one of my favorites of the English bench. They asked if I would
write an introductionto their two papers, to which I readily agreed. But
once I read theirpapers,my old fascinationwith BaronBramwellrevived;
so I chimed in with a longish contributionof my own, designed to offer a
qualified defense of Baron Bramwell against his many critics, past and
present. I must say that the closer I looked the more I was astonishedat
how my own views had so often trackedhis, often by a form of unconscious parallelism:I did not know, for example, of his fascination with
special pleading-a subjectdearto my own heart2-but me, that I did not
think had any clear political connections. It is just that this similarityof
thoughtoften explains why we have, at both levels, been outsidersto the
dominantlegal traditions.
Here is not the place to explore the overlap in our own views, but to
speak briefly of Bramwell directly. By the reckoning of his own contemporaries, Baron George William Wilshere Bramwell stood out as one of
the dominantjudicial intellects of his time. The key events in Bramwell's
life can be briefly stated.He was born in 1808, had an early careerin merchant banking in his father's house, was admitted into pupillage at
Lincoln's Inn in 1830 when he was 22, to the InnerTemple six years later
when he was 28, and was finally called to the Bar in 1838 where he
served with distinction for 20 years. He was appointedto the bench as a
Baron of the Exchequerin 1856, when he was duly knighted, and served
there for 20 years. With the reorganizationof the English Judiciary in
1876, he became a Lord Justice of Appeal-a position he held until his
formal retirementat age 73 in 1881. His judicial efforts did not cease: in
1882, he was given the title of Baron Bramwell of Hever, and heardmany
appealsas a memberof the House of Lordsuntil his deathin 1892.
Broadly speaking, Bramwell's career falls into two separatestages.
First, when principles of laissez faire were in the ascendancy, Bramwell
showed the buoyant optimism of his age and assumed the mantle of one
of the leading spokesmen of intelligent reform. Having established his
reputationas a special pleader at the bar, he took active part in the dismantling of the older system of pleading and procedureas a member of
the Common Law Procedure Commission, whose work was translated
into law with the Common Law ProcedureAct of 1852.3 Ten years later,
he was active on a second commission that consolidatedthe English company, or as we say, corporatelaw, which resulted in the passage of the

2. See, Richard A. Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 556
(1973); RichardA. Epstein, Defenses and SubsequentPleas in a Systemof Strict Liability,3
J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974).
3. 15 & 16 Victoria c. 76 ?3. For a positive assessment of his contribution,see W.S.
HOLDSWORTH,HISTORYOF ENGLISHLAW 505 (1927).
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CompaniesAct, 1862.4
As Professor Remasastry shows, Bramwell's second period began,
roughly speaking in 1870 when the dominantmood in England began to
change, and men were less sure that the verities of liberty, property,and
contract were sufficient to meet all the challenges and ills of a modem
industrialsociety.5 Bramwell, however, did not alter his beliefs to stay in
tune with the times, but retainedhis youthful attachmentto the immutable
truthsof laissez faire. No longer an insider, his rhetoriccould take on a
shrill and defensive cast, for he could never understandwhy these plain
truthswere rejectedby the powerful intellectualand political elites of his
own time in favor of collectivist or socialist dogma that he regardedas
destructive of both individual rights and the long-term soundness of the
society as a whole. After his membershipin the House of Lords,he was in
partfreed of the constraintsof being a full-time sittingjudge. It was at this
time that Bramwell, as a founding member and first President of the
Liberty and PropertyDefence League, threw himself into passionate and
often barbeddefense of the same conception of limited governmentthat
animatedhis earlier work: the preservationof peace and good order, the
protection of propertyfrom external aggression and, most critically, the
enforcementof voluntarycontracts.
What made Bramwellunusualeven for the laissez fairejudges of his
own time was his shrewd philosophical insights that inform so much of
his legal work. Many judges are moved by a respect for precedent and
seek to improve law by increments,without seeking to justify, question,
or even identify the first principlesbehind the legal rules. Most have some
sense that the function of judges is to decide cases, not issue pronouncements on the eternal verities. Very few had Bramwell's strong sense of
the architectureof the law, or his ability to make a forthrightstatementof
his position as an integralpartof his judicial work. Indeed, the very clarity and power of his sometimes incautiousexpression made him the most
convenientjudicial foil of reformersand critics of a latterage.
Owing to the richness and complexity of his thought, it is not surprising that Professors Abraham,Remasastry,and myself all learn much
from Baron Bramwell,even if we differ among ourselves in what that lesson would be. Professor Abrahamis in what might be called the mainspring tradition that continues to castigate him strongly for his views.
ProfessorRamasastrytakes a more sympatheticposition, and finds in his
Progressions and Paradoxes a man who defies easy characterization.At
the risk of some oversimplification,she is critical of his judicial application of the principleof freedom of contract,but far more approvingof his
4. 25 & 26 Vict. Ch. 89. (1862).
5. See, the classic account of A.V. Dicey, LECTURES ON THE RELATION
BETWEENLAW AND PUBLIC OPINIONIN ENGLAND DURING THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 62-65 (1st ed. 1905), which divides the nineteenthcentury into three overlapping periods. I. The period of Old Toryism or Legislative Quiescence (1800-1830), II. The
period of Benthamism or individualism (1825-1870); and III. The period of Collectivism
(1865-1900).
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varied achievements and reforms that were in large part driven by the
same philosophical principle that animated his decision in the cases.
Finally, while I am happy to quarrelwith Bramwell on points of detail
and application,I count myself as his defenderboth for his common law
decisions and the largerpolitical philosophythat animatedthem.
To speak of this divergence of opinion, however, is to put the cart
before the horse. The preliminaryinquiry is, why the renewed interest in
Baron Bramwell in the first place? To my mind, the explanationdepends
on many of the factors set out above. The developmentof twentiethcentury law has not proved wholly satisfactory even to its defenders. The
growth of statutorylaw has lead us away from questions of first principle,
and from questions of political morality.Whateverthe weakness of Baron
Bramwell,he confrontedjust these questionsin a blunt and uncompromising way. His opinions may be less authoritativethan those of modem
Americanjudges, but usually they are less verbose and less labored;they
are also more provocative,more informative,and morejurisprudential.In
addition, we have entered, I think, a new phase of political life.
Refutations of laissez faire still fill the air. Much of the intense passion
about its ostensible injustices continues to burn bright. But there is this
difference. Critics of laissez faire are no longer as cocky aboutthe present
alternatives.The size of governmentcontinues to grow; the plate of positive rights becomes even fuller;the dominanceof this new wave of thinking is almost unchallengedin popularcircles. Yet, there is an increasing
sense of disappointedexpectations,a sense that the brave new legal order
is not able to deliver the prosperity,peace, and contentmentthatit once so
freely promised.And try as one may, it becomes harderwith each passing
year to point an accusing finger at the bygone heyday of laissez faire, for
so long cast as the villain of the piece. More immediateexplanationsdominate remote ones, and we must attributeat least some of the failings of
our own times to contemporarypolicies and not to some ill-defined legacy
of a bygone era. Perhapsthe critics are overhasty, and laissez faire contained a core of good sense, perhaps more than modern writers want to
acknowledge.
With our doubts aboutour own jurisprudence,it is perhapsnaturalto
turn to the masters of a bygone age to see whether our generation,too,
should follow in the footsteps of its immediatepredecessorsand repudiate
the doctrines that held sway over much of the nineteenth century. The
readerwill have to be the judge of whetherthe renewed interestin Baron
Bramwell represents an importantchange in intellectual direction, or a
passing fancy that will be quickly forgotten as legal scholars once again
turnto business as usual in the welfare state.
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